ABSTRACT
The epistemological criticism of W. Labov's
quantitative paradigm of (socio)linguistic variability has been focused on two
issues, namely, whether or not (a) variable rules are constructed on a
positivist basis, and (b) the inclusion of probabilities in them makes
theoretical sense.
Adopting a popperian outlook, S. Romaine dismisses the
labovian paradigm as positivist on the grounds that Labov has expressed the view
that he feels entitled to consider his model right since he has diligently
tried time and again to prove it wrong but without success. However, this kind of rhetorical outburst on
the part of theoreticians in favour of their beloved models is quite common
(Popper himself does it) and does not in itself jeopardize the theoretical
value of such models; for, their value
crucially depends on their content, that is, on whether they are constructed in
such a way as to facilitate the most detailed criticism possible. Judging by the severe and meticulous
criticism that has been levelled against the quantitative paradigm over the
years, we can safely conclude that this model has been endowed with a high
degree of refutability.
Romaine also considers it unpopperian that
probabilities are included in labovian rules of variability on the grounds that
no finite number of observations would suffice to prove a probabilistic
statement wrong, for which purpose an infinite number of observations would be
required. However, Labov's approach to
sociolinguistics is commonsense in the popperian sense of the word: it aims at gradually improving, through
criticism, both our understanding of the relevant phenomena and the quality of
our theoretical tools rather than striving to secure an unshakeable a priori
theoretical basis, i.e., before the actual work of sociolinguistic analysis
ever begins. In this context,
probabilities deriving from observed frequencies have to be taken with a sizeable
pinch of salt: they cannot be said to
reflect any inherent qualities of the sociolinguistic data since the nature of
such qualities is normally beyond the researcher's reach; yet, they serve as statements open to
criticism, i.e. they are reproducible and refutable, and, therefore, may lead
to better theoretical models.
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